This article in the Huffington Post outlines a leak from senior administration officials of Obama’s plan for Afghanistan. In brief, it involves an accelerated timetable for inserting an additional 30,000 US troops, bringing total numbers to above 100,000 by the next northern summer. The plan will also include the announcement of an exit strategy, with US troops commencing withdrawal in just 19 months from now.
The operation against the Taliban has failed to appreciate the likely motivations that are fuelling aggression against the Operation Enduring Freedom coalition. Based on an understanding of the current life conditions in Afghanistan and on an understanding of human nature using Graves’ model, here’s what I think the US and allies are facing…
I’ll attempt to simplify this as best I can, but the fact is that human nature is highly complex and dynamic – always changing. The strongest themes likely to be found in Afghanistan are that of Tribalism, with its emphasis on kin connections, sacred tribal land and the safety of the tribal group. This worldview alone is enough to trigger aggression against anyone who would trespass on sacred land and threaten the safety of the tribe. Simply by being there uninvited, the coalition forces are generating hatred amongst the general population.
A second strong theme is that of Powerful Empires, which is reflected in the warlords and power struggles among 
factions and tribes in the country. In an evolutionary sense, this theme is the next natural step after tribalism. History is our witness to that; any tribal people will eventually move into a power based society complete with violence and domination. This may look ugly to westerners but it’s normal human behaviour in these circumstances. By invading and attempting to dominate by power, the coalition forces are declaring themselves players in the local power struggles and will attract aggression from those whose territory they invade.
A third theme overlaid on these first two is that of Authoritarian Order, characterised by the fundamentalist belief systems of the Taliban. This worldview typically uses ‘absolute truths’ such as religion to justify rigid adherence to rules and sacrifice in the name of duty to a higher cause. When combined with the motivations of tribalism and power plays, this third theme can justify and fuel suicidal sacrifice for a cause.
These three themes represent natural, sequential stages of development for countries like Afghanistan. Whether the Taliban is present or not, the first two themes are virtually guaranteed to fuel aggression against an invader. There are many other complex issues at play as well, including the opium trade and cross border dynamics with neighbouring countries.
Unfortunately the US administration has failed to appreciate the complexity of the situation and the motivations of its opponents, and has failed to learn from history – particularly the unsuccessful attempt by the USSR to pacify Afghanistan 1979-1989.
Another 30,000 US troops will simply invite greater opposition from the locals, and by announcing an exit strategy it signals that the goal of ejecting the invading forces is within reach. For Obama, who has inherited this mess, I suspect the main aim is to achieve a short term win and then exit while it looks good, thus saving political face.
This post won 2nd prize in the 2008 World Vision Blog Action Day competition, thanks WV!
In 1993 I spent five months in Somalia, Africa as part of the international humanitarian intervention called Operation
Refugee camp Mogadishu 1993
Restore Hope. Back then I was an infantry officer serving with the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (1 RAR). The Australian Army contributed about 1,000 troops to Operation Restore Hope, which was the first deployment of an Australian combat unit to a war zone since Vietnam.
In 1992 the United Nations had launched UNOSOM I to monitor a ceasefire between local warlords and to escort relief supplies to distribution centres, as famine threatened 1.5 million Somalis. The security situation deteriorated later that year and aid workers came under attack, seriously hampering the relief effort. In November 1992 the United States offered to lead an international military intervention to restore security in Somalia and to re-establish food distribution. The UN security council accepted this offer and Australia subsequently committed the 1 RAR Battalion Group to the Unified Task Force (UNITAF). UNITAF was not a UN force, it was a coalition of willing nations.
I was the first member of 1 RAR to arrive in Somalia, on 2nd January 1993. I spent about two weeks working at the UNITAF Headquarters in Mogadishu, preparing for the arrival of the main Australian contingent by air and sea. US Forces were still bringing local warlords under control at that time, and the old US Embassy compound which housed the headquarters came under regular fire. During my first few days in country, I wrote:
‘It is clear that the Somalis caused their famine through fighting and destroying their infrastructure. It has little to do with drought and lack of food.’
Diary entry, 7th January 1993.
Early one morning I woke to the sound of US Marines attacking a nearby warlord stronghold, and watched as Cobra attack helicopters hovered nearby, firing into the target area. I was surprised at the pilots’ lack of apparent concern for enemy fire, as they were making themselves easy targets. Later that year two US Army helicopters were shot down in the same area, now made famous by the film Blackhawk Down.
Once the main elements of the 1 RAR Battalion Group arrived in Mogadishu, we deployed some 240 kms inland to the town of Baidoa and began taking control of our Humanitarian Relief Sector (an area of about 17,000 square kilometres). Our task was to provide security so that UN relief operations could be restored.
I was amazed at what I saw in Baidoa. The town was once home to a Coca-Cola factory, a Fiat car factory and an agricultural college, but these were now all in ruins. There was no government, no mains power, no running water and no sanitation. Many public buildings had been stripped of timber for use as firewood. Tens of thousands of refugees lived in makeshift camps on the edges of town. How could a civilization regress like this?
Visiting an orphanage in Baidoa, Somalia 1993
Our presence over the next four months brought peace and relief, and we were popular with everyone except the bandits. The UN food relief and the many NGO healthcare operations resumed their activities. Slowly but surely, local businesses began to flourish and with our support the local police service and judicial system were restored.
It was clear to me at the time though, that these results were not sustainable. The age old inter-clan conflicts were not being resolved and as soon as we left, Somalia was likely to descend into chaos once again. History shows that it did.
So on Blog Action Day in 2008, what lessons can we learn from this experience that might help us deal with poverty? Well firstly, solving poverty is a complex business. It’s not just about redistributing food or wealth. Countries that suffer from poverty do so because of complex cause and effect relationships, which must be understood and addressed before lasting results can be achieved. The natural human instinct to want to help others be ‘just like us’ is often not so helpful.
In working towards sustainable results, we must be mindful of a country’s stage of social development. Planning must consider what their next natural step will be, and how that might impact on their social systems and government. Many developing countries, and Iraq and Afghanistan are good recent examples, are not yet ready for USA-style democratic nationhood. The local life conditions dictate that simpler and often localised or regional systems are much more appropriate. Tribal bonds and regional power struggles still carry much more weight than any sense of nationhood.
Thankfully the world is waking up to the complexity of the problem, and the need for sustainable solutions. As with all large scale social issues, we must look to the deep underlying patterns of change in order to understand cause and effect, and then deal with the causes. Addressing the surface level symptoms is not enough.
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